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Abstract
Background: Although human resources for health (HRH) represent a critical element for health systems, many
countries still face acute HRH challenges. These challenges are compounded in conflict-affected settings where
health needs are exacerbated and the health workforce is often decimated. A body of research has explored the
issues of recruitment of health workers, but the literature is still scarce, in particular with reference to conflict-affected
states. This study adds to that literature by exploring, from a central-level perspective, how the HRH recruitment policies
changed in Timor-Leste (1999–2018), the drivers of change and their contribution to rebuilding an appropriate health
workforce after conflict.
Methods: This research adopts a retrospective, qualitative case study design based on 76 documents and 20 key
informant interviews, covering a period of almost 20 years. Policy analysis, with elements of political economy analysis
was conducted to explore the influence of actors and structural elements.
Results: Our findings describe the main phases of HRH policy-making during the post-conflict period and explore how
the main drivers of this trajectory shaped policy-making processes and outcomes. While initially the influence
of international actors was prominent, the number and relevance of national actors, and resulting influence,
later increased as aid dependency diminished. However, this created a fragmented institutional landscape
with diverging agendas and lack of inter-sectoral coordination, to the detriment of the long-term strategic
development of the health workforce and the health sector.
Conclusions: The study provides critical insights to improve understanding of HRH policy development and
effective practices in a post-conflict setting but also looking at the longer term evolution. An issue that
emerges across the HRH policy-making phases is the difficulty of reconciling the technocratic with the social,
cultural and political concerns. Additionally, while this study illuminates processes and dynamics at central
level, further research is needed from the decentralised perspective on aspects, such as deployment,
motivation and career paths, which are under-regulated at central level.
Keywords: Human resources for health, Health workers, Recruitment, Deployment, Fragile and conflict-affected
settings, Timor-Leste
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Background
Human resources for health (HRH) represent a critical
element for the functioning of health systems. Poor
availability and management of human resources have been
recognised as key health system barriers, and despite the
efforts, many low-income countries continue to face acute
HRH challenges [1, 2]. These challenges are compounded
in conflict-affected settings where health needs are exacer-
bated as a result of the conflict and the health workforce is
often decimated by either death or flight due to violence [3,
4]. Consequently, the challenge of attracting and recruiting
the right persons into the health workforce, according to
needs, becomes more acute and relevant [5–7]. Some
studies in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) have
focused on Human Resource Management (HRM) [8–14]
and highlighted how recruitment affects retention in
remote areas [15–19]. Research has also looked at the
specific HRM challenges in fragile and conflict-affected
countries [5–7, 20–27], with a focus on health worker
retention and (financial and non-financial) incentives.
This research adds to that literature by focusing in
particular on the role that recruitment policies and prac-
tices play in rebuilding an appropriate health workforce
after conflict and following the trajectory and patterns
over the subsequent years. Our case study was con-
ducted in Timor-Leste starting from the immediate
post-conflict period up to 2018 (Table 1 and Fig. 1),
which gives a retrospective view covering a period of al-
most 20 years. This paper focuses on policies and
policy-making processes at central level related to health
workforce recruitment and presents a political economy
analysis about how and why both official and informal
practices developed, as well as the drivers, challenges
and blockages at different stages.
Methods
This study is part of a broader research covering HRH
recruitment and deployment in Timor-Leste and explor-
ing both the central and sub-national debates. In the
present paper, we focus exclusively on the central-level
perspective. The research adopts a retrospective, qualita-
tive case study design [28], drawing from documentary
review and key informant interviews. Policy analysis was
conducted, with elements of political economy analysis
which allowed the identification of how elements of the
agency (actors, agendas, power relations) and structure
(socio economic conditions, historical legacies, formal
and informal institutions, cultural norms) contributed to
drive the policy trajectory [29].
Data collection
A document search was carried out to identify published
literature and documents relevant to HRH recruitment
policies and regulatory frameworks in Timor-Leste
between 1999 and 2017. Internet searches were carried
out using Google, PubMed, HRH Journal and Govern-
ment websites (e.g. Official Gazette, Public Service
Commission, UNTAET legislation archives). Addition-
ally, key informants were asked to suggest relevant
Table 1 History and context of Timor-Leste
The history of Timor-Leste has been one of struggle for self-determination.
In 1975, after more than four centuries of colonial domination, Timor-Leste
proclaimed its independence from Portugal. This lasted only 9 days before
Indonesia illegally occupied the country. A repressive government ruled
for 24 years (1975–1999) during which around 20% of the population died
due to violence, starvation and disease [32]. The publication in September
1999 of the results of a UN-backed referendum to determine Timor’s status
in favour of independence triggered a violent withdrawal of Indonesia
which left around 1 400 people killed, more than 300 000 displaced and
the governance structure and infrastructure including the health system
virtually collapsed. In May 2002, the country finally restored its
independence after a UN transitional government (United Nations
Transitional Administration in East Timor—UNTAET) was put in place
from 1999 to 2002 and facilitated the process of development of a
new independent Timorese government [59, 60].
The UNTAET and World Bank-managed support to the transition was
considered a successful development story [38]. Since independence,
there have been four presidential elections (2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017)
and a succession of eight Constitutional Governments, and the country
ranked highest the Democracy Index of the Economist Intelligence Unit
in South East Asia in 2016 [61]. However, an outbreak of violence in
2006–2007, triggered by disputes within the Armed Forces between the
leadership and the ex-FALANTIL soldiers (armed group fighting in the
independence struggle, which had been absorbed into the Army),
caused the displacement of 150 000 people and led to the resignation
of the Prime Minister. This wave of instability revealed the tensions
between leaders, the frustration among the younger population due to
high unemployment, and other state-threatening problems such as
ethnic rivalry between the East and West of the country [62, 63]. The
violent events impacted the health system, although most services
remained available thanks to the Cuban Medical Brigade (CMB) which
was perceived as a neutral health workforce and therefore not targeted
[64]. However, the violence was reported to have had a negative impact
on the perceived State legitimacy [65]. While no such level of violence
has happened since, tensions still prevail and few people have
perceived benefit from the positive development of macroeconomic
indicators [66]. The country has actually greatly benefited from oil
revenues since signing an agreement with Australia in March 2003 on
the exploitation of the gas and oil fields in the Timor Sea [67]. However,
the economic benefits of this have not reached all layers of society
equitably, and in 2014, more than 41% of the population was still
reported to live below the poverty line [68]. In addition, loans from
World Bank, ADB and other bilateral and multilateral institutions appear
to be largely invested in ‘megaprojects’ with limited impact on the
overall economy. Cronyism and corruption are growing significantly [69]
with limited local capacity and accountability being built over time in
this regard, and as a result, the Corruption Perception Index increased
from 28 in 2014 to 38 in 2017 [41]. Related to the violent events in 2006
and following a 14-fold increase in national budget from US$135M in
2006 to US$1 850M in 2013, mainly from oil revenues [70], the civil
service grew by 75% from 20 000 to 35 000 staff [71]. This was reported
to have mitigated the risk of further violence [71], but the increase in
government’s capacity has not been commensurate with staffing
growth; furthermore, the workforce expansion is unsustainable in light
of the decline in oil revenues in more recent years (Fig. 1) [42, 43, 70].
Elections in July 2017 resulted in a minority government which lasted
only a few months before the President dissolved the Parliament in
January 2018 and called for early elections which were held in May
2018. Today, Timor-Leste has a population of 1 167 242 with 70% under
the age of 35, an equal gender distribution and an estimated annual
growth rate of 1.81% [72, 73].
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documentation, and the contextual knowledge of the
team in country also allowed retrieving further docu-
ments. In total, 76 documents were reviewed (a sum-
mary is provided in Additional file 1).
Key informants were purposefully selected to include a
wide range of actors involved in HRH policy-making over
the study period. Twenty key informants were interviewed
(Table 2) by AAG and JM between March and May 2018,
either face-to-face or remotely, in Tetum, English, Spanish
or Portuguese depending on the location and the language
preference of the respondent. A standard topic guide was
used flexibly to adapt to each respondent’s knowledge and
elicit a retrospective enquiry about the main HRH chal-
lenges with a focus on recruitment, policy solutions to
HRH issues, changes in policies and practices, drivers of
change, actors and agendas (Additional file 2).
Data analysis
Information was extracted from the documents using an
Excel-based template including an analytical thematic
framework developed for this purpose (Additional file 3).
Based on this, an initial draft of a ‘policy timeline’ was
prepared which described in chronological order the key
events and changes that had happened. The documen-
tary analysis also helped to identify gaps in the informa-
tion available, so that these could be addressed during
the key informant interviews.
Key informant interviews (KII) were recorded, transcribed
and translated into English (where needed). Verbatim tran-
scripts were manually analysed, using a series of pre-defined
descriptive themes (Additional file 3), but also focusing on
emerging cross-cutting, analytical themes, more apt to cap-
ture the political economy issues and the dynamics which
shaped the decision-making processes [30]. Data triangula-
tion was carried out between different sources of data, com-
paring the narratives of different key informants, but also
triangulating information from informants and documents.
Based on the KIIs’ analysis, the policy timeline was revised,
updated and enriched and key elements, themes and pat-
terns were teased out and discussed among all authors be-
fore the final drafting of the article.
Ethical approval was obtained from the Liverpool
School of Tropical Medicine and from Timor-Leste
National Health Institute.
Results
In this section, we present the main findings of our ana-
lysis following a chronological order to show how events
unfolded overtime. We also highlight the key turning
points and the main drivers and dynamics that shaped the
policy-making processes.
Immediate aftermath of Indonesia’s withdrawal and the
transitional period (1999–2002)
In September 1999, with the violent withdrawal of Indonesia,
the health system, like much of the rest of the social, eco-
nomic and organisational structure and the infrastructure of
Timor-Leste, had been destroyed [31]. In terms of HRH, the
damages were profound. Most of the 135 doctors working in
Timor-Leste under the Indonesian government were
non-Timorese and left; only about 26 doctors remained [32].
Other critical staffing issues included the shortage of mid-
wives, technicians and health managers; the rural-urban im-
balances which were further exacerbated by the insecurity
following the 1999 violence; and the excessive number of
nurses inherited from the Indonesian system [33].
Faith-based and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) were the first to be able to provide basic health
services [31, 34], and to do so, they brought in expatriate
staff, but also recruited and paid local health personnel
available in the districts [35]. Key informants reported
Table 2 Summary of key informants by type and gender
Type of KI TOTAL Gender
M F
Ministry of Health (MoH) 8 8 0
National (governmental non-MoH) 5 5 0
International* 7 4 3
Total 20 17 3
*International actors include both those who were still in Timor-Leste at the
time of the interviews as well as those who had been there some time during
the study period but are now based elsewhere
Fig. 1 Oil and gas revenues in Timor-Leste (2009–2015) (US$ million). Source: [43]
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that recruitment criteria were rather loose as it was not
always possible to find formally qualified staff to fill the
position and vacancy advertisement and recruitment
were often based on word-of-mouth.
We did not do the recruitment per merit. We just
indicated people. […] I called them to the health
centre and proposed them to the expatriates of the
NGOs. If they agree, we’d recruit them. (MoH KI)
While much of the technical and financial support for
the health sector (including HRH) was provided by external
partners [36], the Timorese health leaders of the nascent
Ministry of Health (MoH) were keen to strengthen their
role and increase the legitimacy of the state and the cred-
ibility of the emerging government through the so-called
timorisation process [32, 33]. In line with this state-building
aspiration, it was important for them to build a health
workforce that would distance itself from the Indonesian
one, considered inefficient. Key informants recalled:
The administrators took the line that it wasn’t just matter
of putting people back into the positions they were in and
paying them, but it was creating the whole civil service.
[…] They were very much trying to get a sense of unity
[through the civil service]. (international KI)
This overhaul was to be achieved in three ways.
Firstly, it was imperative to rationalise the number of
health workers (nurses, in particular) employed in the
public sector which was inflated for political and pa-
tronage reasons under the Indonesian occupation. Sec-
ondly, there was a desire to reduce or eliminate
corruption, collusion and nepotism (often referred to
using the Indonesian acronym, KKN) that was a key
feature of the previous system and introduce a merito-
cratic approach. Finally, it was important to create a
health workforce loyal to the new country, excluding
those who had supported the pro-Indonesia militia dur-
ing the independence struggle (KIIs). The aim was to
ensure equitable access to quality service for the entire
population of the newly formed state.
Our leaders wanted to build a public administration
that was not a replica of the previous system. So, when
we defined the regulations to form our public service,
we did not look at the Indonesian model which was
disproportionate. We started from zero. (national KI)
These objectives laid the foundation of the first civil
service recruitment which started in mid-2001
(UNTAET Regulation 2000/03). The final estimate of
the health staff needed was of 1 242 as agreed between
UNTAET, MoH and the Civil Service and Public
Employment Office (CISPE). Informants reported that
this number, about 47% of the 2 632 in place during the
occupation, was mainly dictated by the budget available,
which was limited and dependant on international part-
ners [37]. Fifty job descriptions were developed, vacan-
cies opened, and recruitment of health staff began. In
order to ensure staff retention in remote areas, vacancies
were initially tied to specific locations rather than a cen-
tral pool from which new recruits would subsequently
be deployed (an approach which was later adopted). Ac-
cording to one key informant, in line with the aims of
the recruitment, selection criteria included professional
training, place of birth and perceived loyalty to the new
state, against the Indonesian regime.
The first criteria was that the person had to be trained as
a nurse or healthcare professional. The second, we had
to look for people that were from that district to
facilitate them going there […]. Then the third criteria
that we considered was that it had to be people that in
1999 didn’t run away to Indonesia. These people are a
priority. (MoH KI)
However, a number of issues hampered the recruit-
ment process. The shortage of doctors remained a chal-
lenge and terms and conditions provided by NGOs were
much more favourable so that many stayed in that
sector. Additionally, strikes and protests broke out due
to accusations of favouritism and mismanagement. One
informant recalled:
The Bishop came down to calm the situation at
the hospital and to listen to the demands of the
demonstrators. They were saying that those who
had fought for independence had not passed the
recruitment. So, I went with [xxx] and we modified
the recruitment. Those who had stayed would have
work first, and those who went to Indonesia, they
have to work last. (MoH KI)
In 2001, 724 workers were recruited (Table 3). The
remaining vacancies were filled by international staff
recruited by NGOs or by the MoH with Australian
Government’s funds.
Recruitment was reported to be slow and haphazard
leading to poor morale and loss of trust in the ad-
ministration by those involved in the process [32].
Their analysis lucidly highlights the trade-off between
incompatible ‘technical’ and ‘political’ objectives
(Table 4) [32]. However, despite the salience of the
HRH challenges identified then, the immediate health
sector reconstruction in Timor-Leste and the model
of post-conflict health system rehabilitation has gener-
ally been judged a success [33, 38].
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A ‘game changer’: the involvement of the Cuban Medical
Brigade (2003–2005)
The idea of requesting Cuban support to address staff
shortages had been discussed since 2001 [39]. In Febru-
ary 2003, this option was adopted at top political level
when an agreement was brokered between the then
President Xanana Gusmao, José Ramos Horta (Minister
of Foreign Affairs) and Fidel Castro for the provision of
Cuban doctors as well as the training of Timorese stu-
dents. The Cuban involvement was described by one key
informant as ‘a game changer’ for the health sector. In
December 2004, the engagement was further detailed as
the training of 1 000 doctors (calculated as roughly 1
doctor per 1 000 population) at the Latin American
Medical School (LAMS) in Cuba1 and the deployment
of 300 Cuban doctors to provide medical care across the
country as well as to supervise and further train the
medical students and new doctors [39].
The use of subsidised training effectively shifted the
focus from post-graduation recruitment procedures to
pre-service education scholarship awards, as those
trained in Cuba were expected to return to serve in
Timor-Leste and were automatically absorbed in the
public health sector.2 While in recent years, the absorp-
tion of medical graduates into public service is becoming
problematic (see below), at the time, it was clear that
scholarship assignment became a synonym of hiring.
Instead of recruiting, the MoH is appointing through
training. (national KI)
The selection of students to access Cuban medical
training was undertaken initially by the MoH, based
on academic results in secondary school, a written
exam, an interview and a physical examination (KIIs).
Gender balance was also sought in the selection, and
quotas were introduced based on the geographical
origin of the candidates,3 with the intention that they
would be deployed in their districts of origin ensuring
an appropriate coverage across districts, increasing re-
tention and health worker acceptability for local com-
munities. Although the geographical criterion initially
created difficulties due to the low skills of those com-
ing from remote areas, these were overcome in subse-
quent years.
By mid-2018, the Cuban-supported programme had
graduated 934 Timorese medical doctors (KII). Based
on the MoH database, this rapid scale-up of the med-
ical workforce has increased the density of doctors
per population from 0.03 to 0.71 per 1 000 in 2000
and 2017 respectively, among the highest in
South-East Asia (Fig. 2). In 2017, the gender distribu-
tion of the medical workforce was almost equal with
a male to female (M:F) ratio of 1.01 although the bal-
ance was in favour of males at specialist level (M:F
ratio of 2.6).
Relapse into violence, stabilisation and expansion period
(2006–2012)
The relapse into violence in 2006 and the tense political
environment affected the state’s legitimacy [40] and led
to a degradation of accountability and transparency with
Table 3 Public workforce situation (October 2001)
Establishment Filled Vacant Vac. rate (%)
National level
National DHS 49 22 27 55
NCHET 32 23 9 28
Central Lab. 22 15 7 32
National Hosp. 251 9 242 96
Districts
Aileu 46 36 10 22
Ainaro 42 34 8 19
Baucau 152 135 17 11
Bobonaro 85 69 16 19
Covalima 58 46 12 21
Dili (District) 123 50 73 59
Ermera 54 38 16 30
Lautem 60 42 18 30
Liquica 39 38 1 3
Manatuto 48 40 8 17
Manufahi 57 44 13 23
Oecusse 57 29 28 49
Viqueque 67 54 13 19
TOTAL 1 242 724 518 42
Source: Civil Service and Public Employment Office (CISPE) 2001
DHS Division of Health Services, NCHET National Centre for Health Education
and Training
Table 4 Competing goals for the recruitment of civil servants
for the health sector
Goal Competing goal
• Produce measurable results
quickly
• Achieve transition to full East
Timorese management
• Disburse funds quickly • Ensure national decision making
and full ownership
• Focus on building capacity
• Ensure sustainability
• Ensure a coherent sector-wide
approach
• Accommodate individual donor
needs
• Provide services to all now • Improve scope and quality of
services
• Develop health policies soon,
before it is ‘too late’
• Consult widely on all policy issues
• Start flexible to avoid setting
directions too early
Source: [32]
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increased perception of corruption and nepotism [41].
This probably influenced recruitment practices for the
health workforce. For example, it is possible that the
settlement of the dispute between government and
ex-FALANTIL soldiers led to the provision of privileges
for the families of veterans of the armed struggle. These
privileges included the possibility of obtaining scholar-
ships for higher education bypassing the entry require-
ments and examinations (Decree Law 8/2009), which
opened the system to opportunities for discretion and
patronage.
From 2011, the responsibility for selecting students
into higher education for all health professions was
moved to the Ministry of Education (MoEd) (KII).
Key informants highlighted the alarming absence of
functioning mechanisms for inter-sectoral coordin-
ation, which not only left room for discretion and
abuse in decision-making, but also had important
consequences for the development of the health
workforce. Indeed, the fact that decisions about access
to training were moved outside the MoH and some
groups were exempted from the standard selection
procedures had (and continues to have) critical conse-
quences in terms of quality as well as of numbers
and profiles of the future health workforce and may
determine a mismatch between intake and needs
which the MoH has been left to deal with.
The MoH is not involved in any decisions on the
number of students. […] There are no mechanisms
for coordination between the MoH and the
MoEd. This is a little bit very sad. […] If we
recruit too much it will be a disaster for our
country. (MoH KI)
The tensions between different national institutions
also reveal that, from the aftermath of the independ-
ence, the decision-making arena has become more
crowded. As a consequence, a number of emerging
competing agendas and interests made coordination
and alignment more difficult. New actors involved in
HRH recruitment and deployment practices included
not only the MoH, the MoEd and National University
of Timor-Leste (Universidade Nacional Timor Loro-
sa’e—UNTL), but also the Ministry of Finance, the
Public Service Commission (PSC), the Human Capital
Development Fund (HCDF) and, more recently with
the attempt to decentralise the deployment process,
the Directors of Municipalities.
As the number of actors involved in HRH
decision-making increased, so did the official legisla-
tion applicable to the civil service in general and to
health workers specifically (Table 5). Importantly, key
informants stressed that these regulations were often
overlooked or weakly implemented. Indeed, in the in-
creasingly fragmented and instable political environ-
ment with constant changes in governments, policies
were often blocked at approval or before implementa-
tion stage. In other cases, funds are lacking to sup-
port implementation.
The implementation of the policies is not
consistent. One government comes in with their
own policy, then suddenly there’s another
government with a different policy and that cause
the inconsistencies. (MoH KI)
The increasing number of actors involved in HRH
processes, their conflicting agendas, the absence or
Fig. 2 Density of doctors per 1 000 population in the South-East Asia Region. Source: WHO Global Health Observatory data repository
(http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.92100)
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non-respect of formal regulations and the weak man-
agement systems all contribute to the weakening of
formal institutions and the emergence of informal
practices. Over time, the recruitment process appears
to be reverting to the previous practices of patronage
and discretion and past hierarchies. This was noted
by the key informants.
In relation to recruitment for the MoH, we undergo
procedures that are not necessarily based upon the
Table 5 Key official laws and regulations on HRH recruitment
Law, Decree law, Directive Content Implementation/comments
Directive 3/2000 (UNTAET) Establishing Civil Service and Public Employment
Office (CISPE)
Directive 4/2000 later defining the terms of the Civil
Service
East Timor Health Policy Framework
(June 2002)
Includes one chapter for Human Resources for Health
(first HRH policy)
Still considered the overall policy framework for the
sector in 2018
Decree Law 5/2003 Organic Statute of the Ministry of Health Establishment of Department of Human Resources
Law 8/2004 Statute of the Civil Service Not fully implemented due to lack of resources (KII)
Decree law 14/2004 Health professional practice including the registration
for health professionals
In the absence of health professional councils
registration of professionals is done at MoH
National Health Workforce Plan
2005–2015 (draft)
Health workforce situation analysis and strategic plan Prepared but not approved/implemented
Government Resolution 6/2006 Policy on Decentralisation and Local Government.
Established the basis for decentralisation to the
Municipal level
Supported by 10/2006 establishing the Secretariat for
Decentralisation
Revised National Health Workforce
Plan 2007–2015 (draft)
Revision of previous National HRH Plan 2005–2011
including workforce projections
Prepared but not approved/implemented
Decree Law 30/2008 Regulation of scholarships to study abroad As a key element of the plan for human capital
development
Decree Law 34/2008 Regulations for recruitment and selection of civil
servants (also promotion)
Further developed with DL 12/2009 (see below)
Decree Law 5/2009 Amending 8/2004 on terms for recruitment The aim is strengthening accountability in
recruitment
Decree Law 7/2009 Establishing Public Service Commission
Decree Law 8/2009 Award of scholarships to children of veterans
Decree Law 12/2009 Defines the rule for awarding scholarships for higher
education and specialisation (terms of bonding
agreements)
Ratified later by Decree 38/2012
Decree Law 36/2009 Legal regime for access to higher education
Decree Law 16/2010 Statute of the Timor-Leste National University
Decree Law 22/2011 Amendment to DL 34/2008 re. recruitment, selection
and promotion of civil servants
More specific regulations about processes and criteria
for recruitment, selection and promotion
Timor-Leste Strategic Development
Plan 2011–2030
Including HRH recruitment policy directions and
minimum staffing norms
Approved and being implemented
National Health Sector Strategic
Plan 2011–2030




Detailed procedures including one chapter for
recruitment and selection
Approved and being implemented
Orientation 9/2016 Simplified recruitment of 400 health workers Executive order waiving 400 newly graduated HWs
supported by Government from technical tests
Ministerial Diploma 51/2017 Saúde
na Familia (Family Health)
Establishing the principles and procedures for
the introduction of this family-based PHC model
This programme was a Prime Minister’s initiative
National Health Workforce
Plan 2018–2022
Projections updated from NHSSP 2011–2030 Drafted and waiting for government approval
MoH Dispatch 07/2018 Internships Regime (Internato) for newly graduated
health workers beneficiaries of scholarships.
Terms of the agreement to recruit 320 unemployed
health workers as interns
Ministerial Dispatch 05/2018 Establishment of Liaison with Cuban (and Chinese)
Medical Brigades
To facilitate communication and coordination
MoH/C(and CH)MBs
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principles of meritocracy. […] We observe the issue of
corruption, collusion and nepotism, the family
approach. Why this is happening? Because, apart from
being a post-conflict country, there are also demands
for livelihoods. At the same time, we have significant
gaps in regulations and procedures that define the re-
cruitment process and therefore it was still dominated
by a situation called ‘calling each other’ (politika bolu
malu). (national KI)
HRH reforms under fiscal constraints (2013–2018)
The HRH challenges highlighted above have been made
starker by the fiscal constraints, which increased in 2012
when oil revenues dwindled and has worsen since 2015
when the reserves in the Petroleum Fund begun to di-
minish [42, 43]. Yet a World Bank study [44] reported
that the health wage bill increased by 344% between
2008 and 2014, mainly due to the absorption of the
newly graduated doctors into the public sector (Table 6),
despite the fact that doctors’ salaries are not substantially
higher than those of other health professionals [45].
In this context, the absorption into the public sector
of the growing number of health workers became a
pressing problem. Although estimates vary (from 200 to
600), a high proportion of the pool of qualified doctors
and other professionals is currently unemployed, due to
lack of funds from the Ministry of Finance to recruit
them into the civil service. Worryingly, pressure will be
mounting over the next few years as the sustained pro-
duction of health workers will continue and even in-
creased, based on politically pressured student intake.
Indeed, beyond the privileges accorded to veterans’
families described above, the introduction in 2016 of a
‘special regime’ to access higher education, following a
simpler selection process without technical tests, for
families of military and police officers, diplomats,
members of Parliament, journalists, elite athletes and
students from international secondary schools [46] con-
tributed to this problem. While in principle, only 10% of
the annual intake should be recruited through this mo-
dality, key informants noted that the system is abused
because of the (politically pressured) acceptance of a
high number of students through the special regime. For
instance, in 2018 more than 65% of students enrolled in
Nursing studies, 60% of those in Midwifery and 35% in
Medicine went through the ‘special regime’ (Table 7).
While the Cuban Medical Brigade (CMB) deliberately
kept out of the politics and simply scaled up their train-
ing capacity, the choice, as one respondent explained,
has obvious long-term consequences for the quality and
distribution of the workforce:
We need to fix the special regime because the veterans’
children have low marks, but they all choose Medicine.
[…] If they don’t have a good understanding [of
Medicine] then they might give the wrong medication
or make mistakes, and this is a problem. (national KI)
As an interim measure to address the absorption issue,
a dispatch from the Minister of Health (07/2018/I/MS)
was issued in January 2018 to recruit 320 recently gradu-
ated health workers as interns (regimen de internato)
with a standard stipend regardless of professional level
of $200 (in rural areas) and $150 (in urban locations) for
a period of 6 months to be extended if the need persists
and the performance of the intern is satisfactory. How-
ever, as KIs said, the success of this programme in redu-
cing the tensions is yet to be seen, and there is a
widespread perception that the government has been
and continues to waste money on the training of medical
doctors rather than using data and evidence on the real
needs.
The contrast of the current situation with the immediate
post-conflict phase could not be starker. As one respond-
ent put it:
At that time, we didn’t have the people, but the
money was there. Now it is probable that we have too
many people but not the money. (MoH KI)
Discussion
Our analysis has some limitations. First, the long period of
time covered, spanning over almost 20 years, created chal-
lenges during data collection, both in terms of locating and
accessing documents that may have been lost, as well as
contacting key informants, in particular international ac-
tors who have left Timor-Leste. Data were also difficult to
retrieve due to the weak information systems. Additionally,
many interviewees struggled with recall bias. However, the
Table 6 Number of staff by cadre in the public health
workforce
Grades/cadres 2005 2010 2015 2016 2017
General grades 356 615 1 289 1 270 1 225
Special grades
Medical Specialist 0 9 23 23 29
Medical Doctors 40 75 820 835 891
Midwife 274 388 533 586 619
Nurse 820 883 1 139 1 205 1 272
Assistant Nurse N/A N/A 237 234 232
Allied Health Professionals 100 316 440 512 630
Total special grades 1 234 1 671 3 192 3 395 3 673
Total all grades 1 590 2 286 4 481 4 665 4 898
Source: MoH HRH Database 2017
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fact that respondents were open about it and distinguished
between clear and only vague memories helped us make
sense of their accounts. In a sense, even the mental selec-
tion between remembered/forgotten could be interpreted
as an indicator of the key, most debated and contested
areas of decision-making. In line with this, in order to elicit
views on issues clearly remembered and to reduce recall
bias, the topic guide we developed focused on the most
relevant changes or challenges which respondents were
asked to reflect on. We also carefully applied triangulation
between different key informants as well as with docu-
ments and data to ensure the accuracy of the information
and the relevance of the analysis.
Throughout the analysis, we have been explicitly re-
flective on our positionality with respect to the study
subject [47]. Some authors (AAG, JM and SP) are ‘in-
siders’ to HRH policy-making in Timor-Leste and, al-
though in different roles, have been directly involved in
the policy changes described. This has advantages in
terms of accessing information and actors as well as
bringing participant observations to the analysis, but it
may reduce objectivity [48]. The presence of ‘outsiders’
among the authors allowed some distance from the
study subject, while at the same time data interpretation
could be collectively and iteratively reviewed.
The study findings provide critical insights to enhance
our understanding of HRH policy development from a pol-
icy and political economy perspective, in a post-conflict
setting, but also following the developments over the lon-
ger period. The analysis allows the identification of the
main phases of the policy trajectory during which different
drivers played a significant role in shaping policy outcomes.
In terms of actors, there was a shift over time as the rele-
vance of external players faded in favour of that of internal
actors and institutions. As in other settings during the im-
mediate post-conflict phase [3, 49–51], Western donors
and multilateral organisations were essential and influential
in the aftermath of the violence to provide financial and
technical support to the nascent Republic, including sup-
porting HRH systems. Later, Cuba became a prominent
player, and despite their professed disengagement from
‘politics’, their views and approaches (e.g. gender and
geographical balance of students selected) undoubtedly
influenced policy-making. More recently, the trajectory in
Timor-Leste took a different direction to many post-con-
flict countries, as national actors have emerged to play a
more prominent role and their number and influence have
increased in an increasingly fragmented political landscape
[52]. It is important to note that the shift in actors’ roles is
closely related to and driven by structural changes (specific
to Timor-Leste’s economic history) and in particular the
move from aid dependency in the first phases of the recon-
struction, to financial independence due to oil revenues
and, more recently, budget constraints related to the
diminishing revenues. Over time, the structural features
remained informed by the formal and informal institutions
(i.e., the rules and norms) which are prevalent in the coun-
try and underlie the overall political and economic context.
Agency and structure elements and their interplay in-
fluenced the policy processes and outcomes. Initially, the
focus was on health workforce recruitment as is often
the case [27], which was seen as fundamental not only
for its contribution to the health sector but also in rela-
tion to the state-building efforts [6]. As in other settings
[53], a key emerging issue was the challenge of achieving
a balance between the ‘what’ (technical) with the ‘how’
(political) [52] and reconciliation of a technocratic
recruitment process based on rules and merit with polit-
ical, cultural, relational norms and practices.
It appears that the recruitment system created in the
aftermath of independence did consider both technical
and political aspects and, perhaps because of this, was
generally effective and survived over time. The relative
success of this first round of HRH reforms could also be
linked to specific individuals, their skills and leadership,
both among external and national actors. Local elites
Table 7 Student intake in the Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences of UNTL (2004–2018)
Department New students
2004 2005* 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010** 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017*** 2018***
General Medicine 26 510 47 15 20 30 – 42 58 38 36 36 35 52 (12) 107 (40)
Nursing 190 70 – 88 69 83 64 20 73 95 (34) 197 (130)
Midwifery 38 99 – 75 68 84 68 22 76 92 (35) 159 (96)
Pharmacy – 35 25 70 63 135
Nutrition – 20 64 59 103
Biomedical/Lab. – 45 120
Total 26 510 47 15 248 199 – 205 195 205 203 123 318 406 821
Source: UNTL Registry
*2005: first mass enrolment for medical education by CMB
**2010: no enrolment of students due to disputes between MoEd and UNTL about UNTL’s accountability in the selection process
***2017 and 2018: Numbers in parenthesis indicate the intake of new students under the Special Regime, clearly surpassing the statutory 10% of the intake (no
data available for 2016 or other cadres)
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were quick to organise themselves with enthusiasm and
focus [32], also because of their state-building aspiration
through HRH recruitment [6], and there was a substan-
tial alignment in their agendas with that of the technical
assistants, as also noted by others [36]. For example, the
need felt by national decision-makers to distance them-
selves from Indonesian rule and ‘KKN’ was in line with
the technical and meritocratic approach of external ad-
visers. Additionally, the fact that initially there were few
actors in the decision-making arena limited the presence
of competing agendas and disagreements. However,
while this led to the re-establishment of a HRH recruit-
ment system, the fact that the focus of our analysis rests
predominantly on recruitment processes and doctors
(rather than on other HR management issues or on
other health professionals) highlights how these ele-
ments were priorities for policy-makers at central level,
while other cadres and issues (such as, deployment)
remained under-regulated and dealt with at decentra-
lised level, with the lack of overall strategy and clear offi-
cial policies to enact, as documented also elsewhere [11,
12, 54]. Additionally, policy-makers paid little or no at-
tention to health workers’ job preferences [45, 55] and
decision-making remained a top-down exercise.
Later, while the technical foundations of the recruitment
system remained in place and were actually strengthened
by institutions such as the PSC, the shift to ‘appointment
through training’, due to the Cuban-supported training and
to the virtually automatic absorption of newly graduated
staff, meant a shift of power from the MoH to new actors
(such as, MoEd and UNTL) with diverging interests not re-
lated to the long-term needs of the health sector, and in-
creased the possibility of rule-bypassing, discretion and
patronage.
The tension between competing agendas may have been
initially reduced or resolved thanks to the fiscal expansion
and to the presence of the CMB and their ‘substitution’
role [56, 57]. However, with decreasing oil revenues, the
CMB potentially phasing out and increased political frag-
mentation, the competing interests are more difficult to
reconcile and the tensions appears starker and riskier in
the long term, leading to a low-quality workforce, in-
appropriate skill-mix, geographic maldistribution and fi-
nancial unsustainability [58]. In the future, it will be
essential that policy processes in Timor-Leste lead to
more robust, sustainable and better implemented strat-
egies on HRH training and recruitment.
Conclusions
Our research aimed to provide a long retrospective ac-
count of the development of the systems to recruit
health workers in post-conflict Timor-Leste. In this
study, we explored the policies in place at central level,
the main phases and key drivers of their evolution. Our
findings point to patterns and elements both of the
agency and structure in shaping the policy-making
processes and outcomes.
While the influence of international actors was a promin-
ent feature of the initial phase after the conflict, in
Timor-Leste, there was an important change as national ac-
tors increased in numbers and relevance later on. This shift
led to a fragmented institutional landscape with diverging
agendas and lack of inter-sectoral coordination, to the detri-
ment of the long-term strategic development of the health
workforce and the health sector. Furthermore, a key issue
that cuts across all phases is the difficulty in reconciling the
technocratic elements of the reforms with the social, cultural
and political aspects. Finally, the research component dis-
cussed here looks exclusively at processes and dynamics at
central level, and finds that they have focused on regulating
HRH recruitment and production, which are the most vis-
ible aspects for those operating centrally. Further research
on issues such as deployment and transfer, motivation, pro-
motions and career paths (unregulated areas at central level)
as well as on how implementation practices differ, modify or
bypass central regulations, from the perspective of decentra-
lised actors will be important to shed further light on the
topic and complement the central-level perspective.
Endnotes
1In 2005, following the hurricane that affected Cuba,
some of the medical training was moved to Dili where a
Faculty of Medicine was established within the National
University of Timor-Leste (UNTL), with Cuban teachers.
Currently, students complete their training fully in
Timor-Leste and nine Timorese doctors are being
trained as faculty for pre-service education (KII).
2While newly graduated doctors are fast-tracked into
the public workforce, nurses and midwifes have to sit an
exam for the recruitment into the civil service, under the
oversight of the Public Service Commission with a full set
of mechanisms to ensure meritocracy and fairness
(Human Resources Management Manual, PSC 2014).
3It is interesting to note that district-based quotas
apply to medical students and not to other health
sciences careers (e.g., nursing or midwifery).
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